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Value-based decisions often involve comparisons between benefits and costs that must be 
retrieved from memory. To investigate the development of value-based decisions, 9-to-10-year-
olds (N=30), 11-to-12-year-olds (N=30), and young adults (N=30) first learned to associate gain 
and loss magnitudes with symbols. In a subsequent decision task, participants rapidly evaluated 
objects that consisted of combinations of these symbols. All age groups achieved high decision 
performance and were sensitive to gain–loss magnitudes, suggesting that required core cognitive 
abilities are developed early. A cognitive-modeling analysis of performance revealed that 
children were less efficient in object evaluation (drift rate) and had longer nondecision times than 
adults. Developmental differences, which emerged particularly for objects of high positive net 
value, were linked to mnemonic and numerical abilities. 
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Good + Bad = ? Developmental Differences  
in Balancing Gains and Losses in Decisions from Memory 
Decision makers of all ages encounter situations that have both beneficial and costly 
consequences. Decisions about what we like or prefer (value-based decisions) thus often involve 
a consideration among competing attributes. Relevant information about benefits and costs, 
however, is rarely directly provided in the environment but must be retrieved from memory. 
Preference construction from memory can explain a wide variety of behavioral phenomena 
(Reyna, Lloyd, & Brainerd, 2003; Stewart, Chater, & Brown, 2006; Weber & Johnson, 2006). 
For example, children may face conflict of approach versus avoidance because objects or 
situations are associated with both positive and negative valence based on past experience 
(Lewin, 1935). Constructing subjective value from memory and comparing attributes to evaluate 
utility involves, in particular, associative-memory processes (Shadlen & Shohamy, 2016). 
Neuroeconomic research has demonstrated the relevance of medial temporal brain regions for 
these processes (Enkavi et al., 2017; Glimcher & Fehr, 2014; Gluth, Sommer, Rieskamp, & 
Büchel, 2015). Based on these findings and on the premise that brain structures relevant for 
associative remembering are developed early in the lifespan (e.g., Shing et al., 2010), we 
investigate the development of rapid value-based decisions based on memory representations. 
In this study, we test how well children and early adolescents, relative to adults, perform 
value-based decisions that involve elementary gain–loss comparisons. In younger adults, 
decisions involving both gains and losses tap into difference-based representations of subjective 
value and are more accurate and rapid the larger the net value (Basten, Biele, Heekeren, & 
Fiebach, 2010). How such regularities develop and how they are associated with developmental 
cognitive change, however, is largely unknown. We analyze the underlying processes of value-




based decisions with a drift-diffusion model, assuming that preferences can be constructed 
through sequential sampling from memory (Johnson & Ratcliff, 2013; Konovalov & Krajbich, 
2017; Rangel, Camerer, & Montague, 2008). This modeling approach disentangles 
psychologically important components of decision making and allows us to account for 
developmental differences in all aspects of the behavioral data, including response time (RT). 
Moreover, we explore the mnemonic and other cognitive abilities that these decisions recruit. 
In what follows, we first discuss the relevance of associative memory in value-based 
decision making. We then review research on adults’ and children’s gain–loss valuation and 
identify open questions regarding the cognitive abilities that may underlie developmental 
differences. Finally, we describe the paradigm and modeling approach that we use to investigate 
the development of value-based decisions from memory and report a study with fourth-grade 
children, sixth-grade early adolescents, and young adults. 
The Development of Associative Memory 
To evaluate objects, their positive and negative attributes are often derived by probing 
memory for past experience. Value-based decisions are therefore closely interwoven with 
memory and learning processes (see Shadlen & Shohamy, 2016). Specifically, value-based 
decisions likely involve associative memory, which refers to processes relevant (a) for retrieving 
the links between objects, persons, or situations, and their experienced values (Gluth et al., 2015) 
and (b) for binding these features into a compound mnemonic representation. What differences 
between children and adults can be expected? Developmental research indicates that associative 
memory functioning (which largely involves the medial temporal lobe system) is relatively 
mature by middle childhood (see Shing et al., 2010, for an overview). Four-year-olds already 
show a remarkable ability to bind information in memory (Sluzenski, Newcombe, & Kovacs, 




2006). To the extent that value-based decisions tap into associative memory processes, one may 
thus expect younger children already to perform such decisions relatively well. 
Relatedly, developmental theories about the influence of different memory 
representations on decision making have emphasized a developmental trend from childhood to 
adulthood from predominant reliance on quantitative to qualitative evaluation. Specifically, 
fuzzy-trace theory (e.g., Reyna, 2012; Reyna et al., 2003) suggests that children—within the 
limits of their computational capabilities—tend to rely relatively more on verbatim than on gist 
memory representations (which support exact quantitative vs. meaning-based qualitative 
evaluation, respectively); hence, even though accuracy of both types of memories increases from 
childhood to adulthood, it is conceivable from this perspective that even younger children can 
perform relatively accurately if decisions require matching perceptual information with 
associated values. 
The Development of Gain–Loss Comparison in Decision Making 
Motivational Sensitivity to Gains and Losses 
The valuation of positive and negative attributes has received considerable attention in 
research on judgment and decision making with adults (e.g., Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & 
Anderson, 1994; Gächter, Johnson, & Herrmann, 2007; Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1968; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992). One key notion in this research is that people often perceive and treat gains 
and losses differently. For instance, losing $100 may hurt more than winning $100 feels good. 
The concept of loss aversion implies that losses have a stronger impact on decisions than 
equivalent gains (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). Adults have shown behavior consistent with loss 
aversion in various studies (e.g., people typically avoid symmetric bets in which an amount of x 
or –x, respectively, can be gained or lost with equal probability; Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 




2007). However, recent research suggests that loss aversion does not operate in all situations 
involving losses: for example, when gains and losses occur simultaneously (or sequentially 
within a short time), when only small-to-moderate amounts of money are at stake (Harinck, Van 
Dijk, Van Beest, & Mersmann, 2007), or when outcomes are learned from experience, there is 
sometimes no loss aversion in adults (Erev, Ert, & Yechiam, 2008; Yechiam & Hochman, 2013, 
for an overview). 
 How does the processing of gains and losses in decision making develop? Little is known 
about developmental differences in riskless gain–loss decisions from memory. In contrast, a 
wealth of research has examined the development of decision making involving trade-offs 
between gains and losses under risk (where the outcomes occur with some clearly specified 
probability; Boyer, 2006; Defoe, Dubas, Figner, & van Aken, 2015; Reyna, 2012). Moreover, 
developmental research has examined decisions in which information about probabilities is 
incomplete or ambiguous (e.g., Tymula et al., 2012) or in which both outcomes and their 
frequencies are uncertain and must be explored through experience (Rosenbaum, Venkatraman, 
Steinberg, & Chein, 2017; van den Bos & Hertwig, 2017). Further developmental studies have 
addressed how punishment and reward influences children’s decisions in reinforcement learning 
(Costantini & Hoving, 1973; Hämmerer, Li, Müller, & Lindenberger, 2010; van Duijvenvoorde, 
Zanolie, Rombouts, Raijmakers, & Crone, 2008). One overarching finding emerging from this 
research is that motivational sensitivity towards outcomes (e.g., tokens or monetary value) 
changes fundamentally from childhood to adulthood on both the behavioral and brain level 
(Beitz, Salthouse, & Davis, 2014; Hämmerer et al., 2010; van Duijvenvoorde et al., 2008, 2015; 
Weller, Levin, & Denburg, 2011). 




On the one side, there is evidence that younger children already choose as if losses had a 
relatively stronger impact than gains. Like adults, for example, preschool children make riskier 
choices to avoid losses than to achieve gains in reflection problems (e.g., Reyna, 2012). Greater 
impact of negative than of positive feedback on children’s decisions has also been observed in 
reinforcement learning (Costantini & Hoving, 1973; Hämmerer et al., 2010). Moreover, children 
as young as 0 years show endowment effects in trading behavior, presumably reflecting a 
stronger psychological impact of losing an endowed good over gaining another (Harbaugh, 
Krause, & Vesterlund, 2001). 
 On the other side—and at odds with key notions in decision research with adults 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1991)—gains (rather than losses) appear to have a particularly strong 
motivational influence on decisions during specific developmental phases. Neurodevelopmental 
models suggest that this might be due to an imbalance between reward-related processing and 
cognitive control, which leads to strong responsivity to reward during adolescence (Somerville, 
Jones, & Casey, 2010; Steinberg, 2008). For example, Cauffman et al. (2011) examined 
approach behavior (operationalized as tendency to play increasingly from advantageous decks) 
and avoidance behavior (tendency to refrain from playing from disadvantageous decks) during 
the Iowa Gambling Task, which requires choices among options (card decks) with both gain and 
loss outcomes. Cauffman et al. reported that approach toward potential gains followed a 
curvilinear pattern across development, with sensitivity to positive feedback (to achieve gains) 
peaking during the adolescent years. Further research suggests that the attractiveness of gains in 
adolescence could be particularly prominent when decision problems involve active exploration 
(sampling of outcomes through experience; Rosenbaum et al., 2017) in heightened affective 
contexts (Figner, Mackinlay, Wilkening, & Weber, 2009). 




Taken together, the findings about specific positivity or negativity effects in gain–loss 
decisions appear complex: Several studies indicate that loss aversion emerges relatively early in 
childhood in risky (Reyna, 2012) and riskless decisions (Harbaugh et al., 2001) and that 
motivational sensitivity to losses may remain relatively stable across the lifespan (Beitz et al., 
2014; Weller et al., 2011). There is also evidence, however, that gains have a stronger impact 
than losses on value-based decisions during adolescence, possibly depending on how information 
about outcomes is acquired (Figner et al., 2009; Rosenbaum et al., 2017). For the present 
investigation of value-based decisions, this implies that losses may not necessarily loom larger 
than gains in tasks in which gains and losses are concurrently remembered and compared 
(Yechiam & Hochman, 2013). Moreover, it seems important to distinguish motivational 
sensitivity to gains (reward) and losses (punishment) from the sensitivity to numerical quantities, 
which may follow different developmental trajectories. We therefore turn to the role of 
numerical and other cognitive abilities that could also be important for understanding 
developmental differences in value-based decision tasks. 
Numerical Abilities 
Decisions about values typically involve the evaluation of quantitative information and 
likely tap into abilities related to numerical processing and magnitude representation. If age-
tailored materials are used under simple presentation conditions, preschool children (around age 
five) already show the basic competence of evaluating both outcomes and their probabilities 
(e.g., Schlottmann & Wilkening, 2011). Moreover, within their capabilities, children appear to 
focus relatively more on quantitative details than on interpretation of the meaning of outcomes in 
decision making (Reyna & Brainerd, 1994). 




However, numerical abilities have rarely been assessed in previous developmental 
investigations of value-based decisions, in which children were exposed to rewards of various 
magnitudes (e.g., Schlottmann & Wilkening, 2011). For adults, it has been shown that their 
perception of symbolic numerals (e.g., “40”) influences their subjective valuation (e.g., of a 
monetary value of $40): People with more exact symbolic-number mappings have more linear 
value functions (Schley & Peters, 2013). Relatedly, a wealth of developmental research indicates 
that the precision of basic numerical intuitions (number sense) continues to increase 
monotonically throughout the school-age years, with highest levels of acuity attained 
surprisingly late in adulthood (e.g., Halberda, Ly, Wilmer, Naiman, Germine, 2012). That is, 
humans acquire increasingly precise representations of nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes and 
their relation to symbolic numerals (e.g., Arabic numerals, “1”, “5”, etc.) throughout 
development. Moreover, the range of accurately represented natural numbers increases 
continuously during childhood (e.g., 8- to 10-year-olds gain experience with the 0–1000 range; 
10- to 12-year-olds with the 0–10,000 range). For an overview, see Siegler (2016). 
Given the potential relevance of these numerical abilities in gain–loss comparisons, we 
explored to what extent they might mediate age differences in value-based decisions. In fact, 
children may be less sensitive than adults to differences between magnitudes because they have a 
less exact (more compressed) mental representation of values. Such developmental differences 
could be particularly pronounced for higher magnitudes, with which children have less 
experience than adults. Thompson, Ratcliff, and McKoon (2016) found in modeling analyses that 
school-age children were less efficient than adults in extracting information from both symbolic 
and nonsymbolic numeric stimuli; these age differences were more pronounced when numeric 
comparisons involved more extreme (higher or lower) values in terms of their numerical distance 




from an internal reference point (numerical distance effect). To the extent that value-based 
decisions also recruit such basic numerical skills, children might have more difficulties 
accurately integrating gains and losses and their sensitivity to the net values of different objects 
could be less pronounced than in adults. 
Fluid Cognitive Abilities 
 A wealth of developmental research has shown that elementary aspects of information 
processing strongly improve as children mature (see Fry & Hale, 2000). Hence, intellectual 
performance on a wide variety of decision tasks—including value-based choice—may depend on 
variables such as speed, working memory, and fluid intelligence. To evaluate the proposed 
influence of mnemonic access and numerical abilities on value-based choice above and beyond 
such elementary capabilities of information processing, we also collected measures of 
participants’ fluid abilities to simultaneously account for their potential impact on the speed and 
accuracy of decision making. 
Overview of the Current Study 
To investigate the development of value-based decisions from memory, we employed a 
child-friendly, modified version of a decision paradigm that separates the learning of outcomes 
from decision making (Basten et al., 2010). We focused on the ages between 9-12 years because 
this has been shown to be an important range for developmental changes in the evaluation of 
positive and negative information (e.g., van Duijvenvoorde et al., 2008) and numerical 
competencies (Thompson et al., 2016) that we expected to contribute to the balancing of gains 
and losses. In our study, school-aged children, early adolescents, and young adults first 
experienced associations between symbols (colors or shapes) and their value (different gain or 
loss magnitudes). In a subsequent decision task, participants then saw individual objects (each 




representing a combination of two symbols) and were asked to accept or reject these objects (that 
yielded overall net gain or net loss). 
Extant developmental studies involving gain or loss outcomes have focused almost 
exclusively on choice patterns (for overviews, see Boyer, 2006; Defoe et al., 2015; Reyna & 
Brainerd, 1994; Rosenbaum et al., 2017; Schlottmann & Wilkening, 2011; van Duijvenvoorde, 
Jansen, & Huizenga, 2015). Here, we applied diffusion modeling that also takes into account the 
time dynamics of decisions. Compared to modeling approaches that focus on choice alone, 
diffusion modeling provides an improved and more comprehensive approach to detect and 
understand developmental differences in value-based decision making. This is because response 
time can provide important information when choices do not differentiate and because there are 
substantial changes in speed of processing from childhood to adolescence (Fry & Hale, 2000; 
Kail, 1991) that can have multiple and different reasons (Thompson et al., 2016). 
Drift-Diffusion Modeling 
Diffusion models (Ratcliff, 1978) have been applied in many investigations of rapid 
perceptual (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008), memory-based (Spaniol, Voss, & Grady, 2008), and 
value-based decisions (Basten et al., 2010; Gluth et al., 2015). A core assumption is that 
decisions result from continuous sampling of evidence over time, moving from a starting point z 
until one of two decision boundaries is passed (Figure 1). Sampling processes are noisy thus 
generating distributions of decision latencies across trials. The diffusion model disentangles 
psychologically meaningful parameters of decision making whose interpretation has been 
validated in selective-influence studies (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Voss, Rothermund, & Voss, 
2004). In the current analysis of value-based decisions, the following model parameters are of 
particular interest: 




The drift rate v quantifies the speed of information uptake. Lower absolute values of v 
imply slower and less accurate decisions. In the present task, drift rate is positive (negative) if 
relatively more evidence is accumulated in favor of acceptance (rejection) of an object, 
associated with the upper (lower) decision boundary in the model. Hence, drift rate quantifies the 
quality of match between a presented object and memory (Ratcliff, 1978) and reflects the net 
evidence resulting from integration of that information from memory (retrieved positive and 
negative attributes; Basten et al., 2010). With decreasing net value (distance) between two 
attributes of an object, the drift rate decreases, people make slower decisions, and they approach 
indifference between response options (Busemeyer & Diederich, 2002; Johnson & Ratcliff, 
2014; Konovalov & Krajbich, 2017). For example, value-based decisions about an object O1 = 
[+100, −20], associated with +100 gain and −20 loss units, are easier than decisions about an 
object O2 = [+100, −60] of +100 gain and −60 loss units (points, tokens, or monetary value). 
Moreover, decisions about objects with the same absolute net values are equally difficult if gain 
and loss attributes are remembered and integrated equally well: For example, decisions about an 
object O2 = [+100, −60] and about an object O3 = [+60, −100] should be equally difficult under 
this assumption. Therefore, the comparison of drift rate for objects of equal net value—but of 
different sign—is used to assess people’s gain–loss attitudes during information accumulation 
and indicates whether this information is sampled differently for gains and losses (e.g., Clay, 
Clithero, Harris, & Reed, 2017). Consequently, we quantify stimulus-evaluation bias by 
calculating the sum of the drift rates for gain and loss objects of equal absolute value: vbias = vgain 
+ vloss (see also Spaniol et al., 2008). If vbias is close to zero, this implies that gains and losses are 
evaluated similarly; if vbias is positive (negative), this implies a relatively stronger impact of gains 
(losses) during decision making. For example, people who score low on indices of loss aversion 




(e.g., in standard lottery tasks) also give more weight to gain- than to loss-related attributes in 
rapid decision tasks and accumulate gain-related information at a relatively higher rate (Clay et 
al., 2017). 
 The boundary separation (parameter a) quantifies the amount of evidence required until a 
decision is made (reflecting a decision maker’s speed–accuracy setting or cautiousness; by 
decreasing a, accuracy is traded for speed, and vice versa). One assumption is that decision 
makers set their stopping rule (boundary) prior to the sampling process. In the current task, for 
example, people might set wider boundaries if they require more evidence from memory to 
reduce uncertainty before they make a decision. The relative position of the starting point 
between these boundaries (z/a) quantifies the amount of evidence required for each decision. 
Therefore, systematic deviations from z/a = .50 (equidistance between boundaries) would 
indicate an a priori response bias (favoring a particular response over the other): Values of z/a > 
.50 would imply a general tendency to accept objects whereas values of z/a < .50 would imply a 
tendency to reject objects. For example, people with a stronger tendency to avoid losses (or to 
maintain their status quo) might require asymmetrically more evidence to accept than to reject an 
object in the current task. 
The nondecision time Ter quantifies the latency of processes before and after the actual 
decision phase: The initial perceptual encoding of presented stimuli (transformation into 
decision-relevant information) and motor response execution following the decision are all 
combined into parameter Ter. Changes in Ter shift the entire RT distributions without affecting 
accuracy. Finally, by assuming variability across trials in drift rates (with standard deviation η), 
in starting points (with range sz), and in nondecision times (with range st), the model can account 
for systematic differences in the RT distributions of correct and error decisions. 





Economic and decision research with adults has shown the importance of associative 
remembering in value-based decisions (e.g., Enkavi et al., 2017; Gluth et al., 2015; Shadlen & 
Shohamy, 2016). Therefore, our first question was this: Is there evidence that school-age 
children can already make such decisions with relative ease, as predicted by developmental 
memory models that suggest an early development of associative memory for details (Shing et 
al., 2010)? 
Second, what kind of developmental differences emerge in value-based decisions and 
which cognitive components may underlie behavioral differences in a diffusion-modeling 
analysis? To the extent that (a) access to memory and numeric valuation develops, we may 
expect increases in the (absolute) drift rate v with increasing age (Ratcliff, Love, Thompson, & 
Opfer, 2012; Thompson et al., 2016). In other words, quality of evidence (signal-to-noise ratio) 
during retrieval and integration of values from memory could be higher in adults than in 
children. To the extent that (b) attitudes to outcomes change from childhood to adulthood, people 
could sample information about gains and losses differently (vbias) and/or they could have 
different a-priori response biases to accept or reject presented objects (z/a). Moreover, 
developmental research has found higher impulsivity and higher tolerance to ambiguity in 
adolescents than in adults (Li, Brannon, & Huettel, 2015; Steinberg, 2008; Tymula et al., 2012; 
van den Bos & Hertwig, 2017). Therefore, to the extent that (c) adults require more evidence and 
sample more information than younger age groups, they could set wider decision boundaries to 
reduce uncertainty from memory. Finally, younger children may need more time than older 
children or adults to perceptually encode the presented information and to execute motor 
responses after a decision is made (e.g., Ratcliff et al., 2012). Therefore, to the extent that (d) 




basic perceptual and motor abilities develop across childhood, we may expect shorter 
nondecision latency Ter with increasing age. 
Our third question addressed the extent to which sources of developmental differences in 
value-based decisions could be accounted for by other core cognitive abilities. We therefore 
conducted correlational analyses between the model parameters and individual-difference 
measures from cognitive and numerical abilities tests. 
Method 
Participants 
We collected data from 30 fourth-grade children (9-10 years), 30 sixth-grade early 
adolescents (11-12 years) from primary schools, and 30 younger adults (18-30 years; mostly 
students) during the year 2014. Data from two fourth-graders were lost due to experimenter 
error. Given these sample sizes and an alpha level of .05, the statistical power to detect medium-
sized interaction effects of η2 = .06 between age group and experimental manipulations on 
dependent variables was at least .80. Participant characteristics and their scores from tests of 
cognitive abilities are reported in Table 1. Participants were paid volunteers of various 
socioeconomic backgrounds (from predominantly middle and upper class Caucasian families) in 
the city Berlin, Germany, and were recruited through local advertisements and a database that 
was only accessible to a limited number of researchers for recruitment purposes at a research 
institution. In Berlin, pupils finish primary school after the sixth grade. All participants (except 
one younger adult) were native speakers of German. However, 13% of adults and 23% of 
children and adolescents also spoke other languages at home. In 7% of adults and 4% of children 
and adolescents, both parents had a migration background. Participants gave informed consent 
(for minors this was done by a primary caretaker) and were tested separately in a quiet laboratory 




room; all procedures were approved by a local ethics committee. Based on pilot testing, all age 
groups could be expected to understand the task instructions and to deal with the stimulus 
materials.  
Materials and Procedure 
Stimuli were four shapes and four colors and the resulting 16 shape-color combinations. 
All stimuli were presented on a computer screen with a black background. During an initial 
training phase, participants learned to associate four different colors and four different shapes 
with gains and losses of different magnitude ranges. The training for color and shape symbols 
proceeded in separate blocks. The mapping of specific symbols to magnitude ranges was 
randomized (which color or shape represented which magnitude range) and the symbols used for 
gain and loss domains were counterbalanced across participants (whether colors represented 
gains and shapes losses, or vice versa). At each trial during the training phase, two symbols 
appeared on the screen. Participants were asked to choose the color (shape) that represented the 
larger gain (loss) and received feedback showing specific point values after each response (see 
Figure 2A). The point values were drawn randomly at each trial from uniform distributions. The 
underlying distributions (magnitude ranges) for the different symbols within each domain 
(shapes or colors) implied a rank order: for example, the values for the color green (experienced 
across trials by a given participant) were never smaller than those for color blue. All participants 
completed at least three training blocks, each including 12 trials (the 43 possible pairings of 
symbols within a domain). If accuracy was below 90% (i.e., more than one error) after three 
blocks for the gain and loss domain, respectively, another block was presented until the accuracy 
criterion was reached. 
In the subsequent decision task, participants saw on each trial an object representing a 




combination of a color and a shape (Figure 2B). Participants had to decide whether to accept or 
reject each object. Specifically, participants were instructed that an object’s overall net value 
could be positive (“gain object”) or negative (“loss object”) and that they would collect the 
points associated with accepted objects and thus “win or lose points, based on their decisions—
like in computer games in which a score is accumulated”. Participants were informed that these 
points would later be translated into a monetary bonus (up to €5), based on the mappings 
between colors/shapes and their gain/loss magnitude. Participants were asked to make decisions 
quickly. 
To ensure that all participants understood the instructions, they first worked self-paced 
through two examples shown on a paper sheet; moreover, a trained experimenter explained the 
instructions to each participant, who then explained them back in own words. If necessary, this 
procedure was repeated until the experimenter was certain that all instructions had been 
understood. Participants then practiced the task for 12 trials with feedback, in which a response 
had to be given within a time window ranging from 0.2s to 4s after stimulus onset. On each trial, 
a fixation cross appeared for 0.5s, followed by a colored shape that remained on the screen until 
the object was accepted or rejected by pressing the F and J keys (this key-response mapping was 
counterbalanced across participants). Participants received feedback for both accuracy and speed 
(“too fast” and “too slow” messages appeared, respectively, for RTs < 0.2s or RTs > 4s). 
Participants then completed 24 blocks of 32 trials each (16 combinations resulting from 
pairing the four colors with the four shapes, shown twice per block, in random sequence). No 
further trial-wise feedback was provided. During the first block, participants could still ask 
questions and consult the experimenter; data from the first two blocks were discarded as practice 
in all subsequent analyses, leaving up to 704 trials available for the analyses of the decision task. 




After each block, participants could take breaks and saw a summary with a running score of 
collected points and their average RT. 
At the end of the session, participants received a memory test, in which the shapes and 
colors were again presented. Participants were asked to indicate which of two shapes or colors 
represented a larger gain or loss (as in the training phase but without getting feedback). 
Additionally, they completed questionnaires and a cognitive test battery measuring aspects of 
fluid, numerical, and verbal abilities (further details are in the Supplement). 
Results 
Training Phase 
After the three training blocks, 61% of the fourth-graders, 60% of sixth-graders, and 70% 
of the adults had reached the accuracy criterion of at least 90% correct comparative judgments 
(see Table 1 for a detailed summary). A 3 (Age Group)  2 (Value Domain: gains, losses) 
ANOVA indicated no significant difference between age groups in the number of blocks 
required to reach this accuracy criterion, F(2, 85) = 1.57, p = .21. Stimuli representing gains and 
losses were learned equally, F(1, 85) = 1.30, p = .26, and this held irrespective of age group [F(2, 
85) = 1.44, p = .24, for the Age Group  Value Domain interaction]. Accuracy in the final 
training block, in which participants had reached the 90% criterion, did not differ between age 
groups, F(2, 85) = 2.74, p = .07, nor between gain and loss stimuli. The interaction between Age 
Group and Value Domain was not significant (Fs < 1). Together, these findings suggest that all 
three age groups had learned the stimulus-value associations similarly well at the end of the 
training phase. 
Decision Task 




We report analyses of decision performance in two parts. First, we examine participants’ 
decision accuracy and RTs and then turn to the diffusion-model analyses. 
Accuracy and response time. Table 2 reports the results separately for gain and loss 
objects as a function of the magnitude of their net value (i.e., the difference between the average 
gain and loss, calculated by using the midpoint of the respective value ranges), represented by 
four value categories: 0, ±40, ±80, ±120 points (see Appendix A for details). Acceptances of 
objects with a positive net value (based on the above categorization) were classified as hits and 
incorrect acceptances of objects with a negative net value as false alarms. The signal-detection 
discriminability index d′, based on the hit rates and false alarm rates, can thus be interpreted as a 
measure of participants’ discrimination ability between objects with positive vs. negative net 
values. 
Overall, discriminability (i.e., d′) was well above chance level for all age groups. This 
suggests that the elementary school children were already capable of performing the rapid value-
based task. A 4  3 ANOVA with net-value level as within-subjects factor and age group (4th 
grade, 6th grade, adults) as between-subjects factor indicated that discriminability was lower for 
the younger age groups, F(2, 85) = 10.19, p < .01, η2 = .19. In addition, discriminability was 
higher for objects of higher value, F(3, 255) = 619.37, Greenhouse-Geisser ε = 0.84, p < .01, η2 = 
.87. This effect was more pronounced for the adult participants than for the younger groups, as 
indicated by a significant interaction between value level and age group, F(6, 255) = 5.28, p < 
.01, η2 = .02; that is, adults were more sensitive to different net values of the objects than 
children or adolescents. 
For RTs of correct decisions, an ANOVA with value level and domain (gains vs. losses) 
as within-subjects factors and age group as between-subjects factor indicated that decisions were 




faster the higher the net value, F(3, 255) = 66.32, ε = 0.52, p < .01, η2 = .43. In addition, 
decisions were faster for gain than for loss objects, F(1, 85) = 19.27, p < .01, η2 = .18. There was 
no effect of age group (F < 1) and interactions with value domain and value level were not 
significant (largest F < 2.28; ps > .10). 
Diffusion-model analysis. To disentangle different cognitive components contributing to 
accuracy and RTs in the decision task, we fit diffusion models (Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff & 
McKoon, 2008) to each individual’s data. For parameter estimation, a maximum-likelihood 
method was used, employing the code from fast-dm (Voss et al., 2004). We chose this method 
because estimation efficiency was an important aspect; nonetheless, the use of other estimation 
approaches (such as chi-square minimization) led to very similar results (for a discussion of 
different parameter-estimation approaches, see Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Lerche, Voss, & 
Nagler, 2017). 
To strive for a good balance between model fit and model complexity, we first performed 
a systematic comparison of conceptually plausible diffusion-model variants: In addition to a full 
model that included all variability parameters η, sz, st (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008), we also 
examined several constrained model variants (cf. van Ravenzwaaij, Donkin, & Vandekerckhove, 
2017). In each of them, different constellations of parameters were free to vary across the within-
subject factors’ net value magnitude and value domain. For model comparison, we determined 
for each variant the BIC that quantifies the trade-off between a model’s goodness of fit and the 
number of parameters (see Appendix B). The goal was to identify the model that performed best 
in describing decision behavior for the average participant as well as for the majority of 
participants. The model variants that we considered did not allow parameters a and z to depend 
on properties of the stimuli. The reason is that these parameters are assumed to be set before 




stimulus onset and may vary only if a decision maker can anticipate or know which condition is 
tested (Ratcliff, 1978), which was not the case in the present paradigm. 
The best-performing model (which allowed drift rates to vary as a function of domain and 
net value) was then employed for more detailed investigations of developmental differences in 
the model parameters. The selected model variant fit the data from all age groups well on the 
individual level. Further information about qualitative and quantitative tests of the models is in 
Appendices B and D. 
We focus on the model components that are important for comparing the age groups in 
the present paradigm: the speed of information uptake (drift rate parameter v); the amount of 
evidence required to make a decision (boundary separation parameter a); nondecision time Ter; 
stimulus-evaluation bias (vbias) and response bias (z/a), that indicate whether participants have 
specific tendencies of evaluating or responding differently to gains and losses. Comprehensive 
distribution plots of all parameters are provided in the Supplement. 
For all modeling analyses, trials with RTs shorter than 0.25s or longer than 3.5s were 
discarded (1% of the trials). The percentages eliminated were 0.96%, 1.27%, and 0.72% for 
fourth-graders, sixth-graders, and college-aged adults, respectively, and did not differ between 
age groups (F < 1). We also examined other cutoff criteria for extreme RTs in the decision task, 
but they would not have altered our conclusions. A mixed-design 3  4  2 ANOVA with 
between-subjects factor age group and within-subject factors net value and value domain 
indicated that (absolute) drift rate was higher when net value of an object was higher, F(3, 255) = 
459.67, ε = 0.75, p < .01, η2 = .83. As shown in Figure 3A and 3B, these increases were 
approximately linear in all age groups. In line with this, Ratcliff (2014) has shown that drift-rate 
functions of stimulus difficulty are often linear—even when corresponding psychometric choice 




functions have a typical sigmoid shape (see also Thompson et al., 2016). Second, the drift rate 
differed between age groups, F(2, 85) = 5.50, p < .01, η2 = .11, indicating more efficient 
processing for adults than for the younger age groups. These age differences were more 
pronounced in the gain than in the loss domain [F(2, 85) = 4.38, p = .02, η2 = .09, for the Age  
Domain interaction] and more pronounced for objects with higher net values [as indicated by an 
interaction between the age group and net value, F(6, 255) = 4.89, ε = 0.75, p < .01, η2 = .02]. 
Third, the (absolute) drift rates were higher for gain than for loss objects, F(1, 85) = 9.61, p < 
.01, η2 = .09. These gain–loss differences in drift were more pronounced for objects with higher 
net values [as indicated by an interaction between value domain and net value, F(3, 255) = 6.63, 
ε = 0.66, p < .01, η2 = .07]. The three-way interaction with age group was also significant [F(6, 
255) = 2.54, ε = 0.66, p = .04, η2 = .05]. 
Regarding the other diffusion-model parameters (see Figure 4), nondecision time Ter was 
lower in older age groups, F(2, 85) = 4.47, p = .01, η2 = .10, as was variability in nondecision 
time (st), F(2, 85) = 3.25, p = .04, η2 = .07. Notably, there were no effects of age on boundary 
separation or on the relative position z/a of the starting point (Fs < 1). Moreover, the modeling 
revealed no response biases (deviations of z/a from .50) in any age group (all ts < 1.27; ps > .21). 
Figure 3C plots stimulus-evaluation bias: Overall, there were main effects of age group 
(indicating that stimulus evaluation was more strongly biased towards gains in adults than in 
younger age groups), F (2, 85) = 4.25, p = .02, η2 = .09, and of net value (indicating that the bias 
for gains increased with higher net-value levels), F (3, 255) = 5.14, ε = .40, p < .01, η2 = .06. For 
objects with gain and loss attributes of equal average magnitude (i.e., with a net-value of zero 
points) there was no stimulus-evaluation bias, t (87) < 1. 




In sum, the modeling revealed developmental differences in the speed of information 
uptake v and in nondecision time Ter. Younger adults’ more efficient sampling was particularly 
pronounced for objects of higher positive net value. Age differences in the boundary-separation 
parameter a and in starting-point position z/a, were negligible. Notably, adults (but not the 
younger age groups) showed a stimulus-evaluation bias towards gain-related (and not towards 
loss-related) information. Hence, there was little evidence for loss aversion in any of the age 
groups. To examine the generality of this finding, we also analyzed traditional choice-based 
measures of outcome attitude using regression. 
Logistic regression. Following Tom et al. (2007), we assessed sensitivity to gains and 
losses by fitting a logistic regression to each person’s decisions (with gain and loss magnitudes, 
respectively, as predictor variables and object acceptance vs. rejection as criterion). Based on this 
analysis, we calculated the ratio of loss/gain impact (regression weights) to obtain individual 
 parameters (that represent loss aversion in the prospect-theory value function; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992). Analyses of individual  parameters provided no evidence for loss aversion 
(median   ) and otherwise led to similar conclusions as reported above. Moreover, the 
 parameters correlated moderately with stimulus-evaluation bias (vbias) in the diffusion model. 
Further details of these analyses are in the Supplement. 
Memory Test 
As could be expected, post-task memory for the value-symbol associations at the end of 
the session (approximately 45 min after the training phase) had declined relative to the accuracy 
achieved at the end of the training, F(1, 85) = 33.62, p < .01, η2 = .28. There were no age 
differences in accuracy in the memory test (F < 1). However, measurement time (pre vs. post) 
interacted with value domain, F (1, 85) = 33.62, p < .01, η2 = .28, reflecting that although 




accuracy for gains and losses did not differ at the end of training (before the decision task), after 
the study all age groups remembered symbol-value mappings somewhat better for gains than for 
losses, F (1, 85) = 4.86, p = .03, η2 = .05. 
Relation to Cognitive Ability Measures 
What are possible reasons for the observed age differences in drift rate and in nondecision 
time? On the one hand, they could reflect differences in the mnemonic accessibility of feature-
value mappings; alternatively, they could reflect differences in how the age groups integrate the 
relevant information during the decision process to determine net evidence. To explore these 
possibilities, we analyzed the relation between the model components and measures of core 
cognitive abilities. 
Specifically, we examined whether individual differences in memory, numerical, fluid, 
and verbal abilities from a cognitive test battery could account for observed age differences in 
drift rate and nondecision time. Age groups differed across cognitive tests (with the general and 
expected pattern of higher scores with increasing age; Table 1). Detailed descriptions and zero-
order correlations between all test scales and model parameters are in the Supplemental 
Materials. Moreover, correlations among RTs, accuracy, and model parameters largely replicated 
the patterns found in many other decision paradigms (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008). That is, RTs 
were most strongly related to boundary separation (r = .88) and accuracy to drift rate (r = .60), 
but there was no relation between drift and boundaries across subjects (r = −.01). 
Multiple mediation analysis. We first computed composites of average drift, of 
memory, numerical, and fluid abilities, by grouping the test scales based on their conceptual 
similarity (Table 1). For example, the numerical composite included tests of subtraction (one, 
two, and three-digit numbers), of arithmetic number comparison, and of number-line mapping. 




The fluid-abilities composite included tests of cognitive speed (digit-symbol substitution), of 
logical reasoning (matrices), and forward and backward span. The memory measure included 
participants’ performance during learning and in the post-task memory test. 
We next examined which cognitive abilities might account for the observed age 
differences in drift rate and nondecision time: Notably, multiple mediation analysis (see 
Appendix C for details) with age as predictor, and memory, fluid, numerical, verbal abilities as 
mediators, revealed that developmental differences in drift rate were fully mediated through 
memory and numerical abilities—but not through fluid or verbal ability scores. There were no 
significant indirect effects of age on nondecision time through any of these measures. These 
results suggest that developmental differences in value-based decisions are driven by both 
memory access (decoding the value domain and the magnitude of an object’s attributes) and 
numerical abilities (potentially related to integration and balancing of gains and loss values). 
Discussion 
How do children make value-based decisions that require retrieval of gain and loss 
attributes from memory? And which cognitive abilities might explain possible developmental 
differences? We addressed these questions in a paradigm in which children, young adolescents, 
and adults, made rapid decisions about objects that differed systematically in value and that had 
monetary consequences. 
The findings show that people in all age groups were faster and more accurate in 
responding to objects associated with more extreme gain or loss values. Concordant with this, 
economic models propose that the value difference between attributes determines the difficulty 
or strength in preferential decisions (e.g., Glimcher & Fehr, 2014; Johnson & Ratcliff, 2014; 
Konovalov & Krajbich, 2017). The current study confirmed this regularity in children’s value-




based decision making. Notably, young adolescents as well as children achieved relatively high 
accuracy and monetary reward, compared to adults. Nonetheless, behavioral and modeling 
analyses also revealed systematic developmental differences: First, discrimination ability 
between positive gain and negative loss objects was somewhat lower in children and adolescents 
than in adults. In the modeling, this was reflected in reduced information uptake during decisions 
(drift rate v) in the younger age groups and lower sensitivity to different net-value magnitudes, 
indicating developmental differences in memory access and value integration that emerged 
particularly for objects of higher positive value. Second, no age group showed a-priori response 
tendencies to accept or reject objects (response bias z/a), but adults were positively biased during 
stimulus evaluation (i.e., a relative facilitation of sampling gain-related information). Hence, 
there was little evidence for loss aversion, but adults differed from the younger age groups in 
how they extracted information from memory to evaluate objects. Third, there were no 
developmental differences in decision cautiousness (parameter a), suggesting that age groups 
required similar levels of evidence to come to a decision and tolerated similar levels of 
mnemonic uncertainty. Fourth, nondecision latency (parameter Ter) decreased with age. This 
indicates that the speed of elementary perceptual and motor processes develops from childhood 
to adulthood, replicating a common pattern from developmental modeling studies in other rapid 
decision tasks (Ratcliff et al., 2012; Thompson et al., 2016). Finally, the observed age differences 
in information uptake (drift v) were fully mediated through measures of participants’ numerical 
abilities and their memory of symbol-value mappings, while controlling for fluid and verbal 
abilities. 
Implications for Understanding the Development of Value-Based Decisions 




Based on research with adults (Gluth et al., 2015; Shadlen & Shohamy, 2016), we 
assumed that value-based decisions are closely intertwined with associative remembering. 
Lifespan theories of memory development propose that associative memory components are 
relatively mature by middle childhood and involve early developed brain structures (e.g., Shing 
et al., 2010). The present findings confirmed this expectation for value-based choice in children 
and young adolescents, who showed similar performance: Decisions were remarkably accurate 
and rapid, in line with the assumption that the mnemonic abilities required for value-based 
choice (such as forming associations between object features and their values) are developed 
from an early age. These results also fit the notion that children, within their cognitive 
capabilities, tend to rely on memory for perceptual detail (Brainerd, Holliday, & Reyna, 2004). 
For example, to the extent that decisions involve specific quantitative cues about value, fuzzy-
trace theory suggests that younger children may already utilize relatively precise verbatim 
memory representations (Reyna, 2012; Reyna et al., 2003). 
In the current study, adults assigned relatively more weight to gain than to loss attributes 
during stimulus evaluation whereas neither children nor young adolescents showed such 
positivity effects. Higher motivational sensitivity to gains in adults than children has also been 
observed in other reward-based paradigms and has been attributed to the development of 
dopaminergic neuromodulation (see Hämmerer et al., 2010). However, from the perspective of 
neurodevelopmental imbalance models, a more pronounced impact of gains in adolescents than 
in adults was expected (e.g., Somerville et al., 2010). The adolescents in the present study were 
relatively young (M = 11.6 years). It is conceivable that increased responsiveness to rewarding 
stimuli emerges only during later adolescence, and particularly when decisions involve active 
exploration in heightened affective settings (Figner et al., 2009; Rosenbaum et al., 2017). 




Notably, there was little indication of loss aversion in any age group. Our modeling 
analysis of stimulus evaluation (vbias) and response bias (z/a) did not indicate stronger impact of 
loss than gain attributes on decisions. In other words, to accept objects in the task, people did not 
require that remembered gain values were larger than loss values; moreover, people did not 
require more evidence for acceptance than for rejection of objects. This replicates and extends 
recent research, suggesting that loss aversion may not operate in children, adolescents, and adults 
when gain and loss outcomes appear concurrently, or when losses are experienced repeatedly 
rather than described (Erev et al., 2008; Yechiam & Hochman, 2013). Other research also 
suggests that adults may even seek for gains when smaller amounts of money are at stake (e.g., 
Clay et al., 2017; Harinck et al., 2007). 
 Age differences in the quality of value-based decisions (drift rate v) emerged mainly for 
objects of high positive (but not of negative) value in the current study. This age effect on 
decision quality was fully mediated by people’s memory for symbol-value mappings (before and 
after the decision task) and their numerical abilities. This could reflect developmental differences 
in the mnemonic accessibility of associated gain values or in the numeric integration of gains and 
losses. For example, adults might have focused more than younger age groups on gain symbols 
during encoding (training), leading to facilitated access to this information during the subsequent 
decisions. Although it is for future research to disentangle these possibilities in greater detail, we 
could exclude fluid abilities and cognitive speed as mediators of age effects on decision 
performance. Fluid cognitive abilities could be more relevant in decisions with more strategic 
requirements that are often made at slower pace, for example, in decisions among attributes in 
information boards (Mata, von Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2011) or among risky lotteries, in which 
probability and value information is explicitly described (Defoe et al., 2015). 




There are some limitations to the generalizability of our findings. For instance, we used a 
selection of perceptual stimuli whose arbitrary associations with values had to be learned in an 
initial study phase. Whereas this approach provides good experimental control over prior 
knowledge and stimulus features, it is important to extend the research on cost-benefit decisions 
to other environments, in which children might use natural associations between real-world 
objects (e.g., toys, snacks, or other familiar items) and subjective value, based on individual 
learning histories (e.g., Horn, Ruggeri, & Pachur, 2016). It is also an open question whether the 
current findings generalize to other non-monetary forms of cost and benefits (beyond point 
values, tokens, and monetary payoffs). In future research, it would also be interesting to 
investigate whether our findings about core cognitive constructs extend to other value-based 
decisions that are not memory based or require different memory representations. For example, 
one approach could be to systematically vary the memory demands (e.g., decisions from 
description vs. decisions from memory) and magnitude information (e.g., Arabic numerals vs. 
icons of different complexity) to assess the role of memory and numerical abilities as a function 
of task characteristics. Moreover, the systematic investigation of rapid value-based decisions that 
tap different memory representations (e.g., gist or verbatim representations) could be an 
interesting avenue: Developmental differences in performance may depend on whether decision 
tasks elicit meaning-based, qualitative or quantitative interpretation of the outcomes (e.g., Reyna, 
2012). 
In conclusion, the current study provides initial insight into the development of value-
based decisions from memory and shows that developmental differences are associated with 
separable cognitive abilities. Our findings reveal that school-age children can already make 
surprisingly good and rapid decisions about value and highlight the importance of basic 




associative memory and numeric processes to explain developmental differences in value-based 
decisions. 
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Table 1. Participant Characteristics, Training Performance, and Cognitive Test Scores 
Variable  Age Group    Age Group  Effect Size 
a  4th grade  6th grade Adults  4th grade  6th grade Adults 
  Ms    SDs   
Age (years) 9.21 11.60 23.50  .42 .50 2.74  
N 28 30 30  − − −  
Gender (N male) 20 14 17  − − −  
Training Performance         
Acc. overall gains .86 .87 .91  .10 .12 .07 .05 
Acc. overall losses .84 .87 .89  .11 .09 .08 .05 
Acc. final gains .96 .97 .97  .04 .04 .04 .04 
Acc. final losses .96 .97 .97  .04 .04 .04 .03 
n blocks gains 3.50 3.87 3.03  1.07 2.16 .18 .06 
n blocks losses 4.00 3.60 3.53  2.21 1.45 1.11 .02 
Post-Task Memory Test         
Acc. Gains .92 .91 .95  .08 .09 .09 .03 
Acc. Losses .88 .87 .90  .12 .19 .21 .01 
Cognitive Tests b         
Vocabulary c 21.59 25.00 28.40  2.71 2.89 1.13 .58*** 
Speed Test (Digit-
Symbol) d 
46.56 60.20 89.83  10.75 8.52 13.66 .73*** 
Reasoning Matrices d 9.59 12.40 12.10  2.71 1.57 1.79 .27*** 
Digit Span (forward) d 8.89 9.17 10.43  1.97 2.28 2.08 .10* 
Digit Span (backward) d 5.85 6.33 8.07  1.73 1.77 2.08 .21*** 
Number Line Task e 10.19 10.93 11.53  1.62 1.46 .94 .14** 
Subtractions e 27.30 32.27 36.23  4.54 3.77 1.92 .52*** 
Arithmetic Comparisons e 28.41 34.63 39.00  6.43 4.16 1.14 .50*** 
Panamath (RT) e 0.96 0.86 0.64  0.17 0.14 0.15 .44*** 
Note. a R2 for main effect of age group; b raw test scores; further details about the cognitive tests are in the online supplement; N = 
sample size; grouping of test scales: c verbal, d fluid, e numerical abilities 
Acc. = proportion of accurate choices (comparative judgments); overall = across all training blocks; final = in final training block; 
n blocks = number of training blocks needed to reach the learning criterion; RT = response time in s 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
  





Table 2. Performance in the Decision Task as a Function of Age Group and Value Level:  
Hit Rate, False-Alarm Rate, d′, and Response Times 
Variable  Means   Standard Deviations 
 4th grade  6th grade Adults 4th grade  6th grade Adults 
N trials 697 695 699  13 17 12 
Hit Rate       
HR1 .43 .51 .56 .24 .21 .22 
HR2 .73 .77 .85 .17 .21 .15 
HR3 .89 .88 .96 .12 .15 .06 
HR4 .96 .93 .98 .07 .17 .02 
False Alarm Rate       
FAR1 .46 .51 .54 .23 .21 .23 
FAR2 .26 .22 .18 .18 .15 .17 
FAR3 .14 .11 .05  .17 .14 .09 
FAR4 .06 .05 .03  .07 .07 .06 
Discriminability d′       
d′1 −.05 −.02 .05 .26 .25 .21 
d′2 1.62 1.89 2.39  .67 1.08 1.01 
d′3 2.81 3.11 4.17  .95 1.34 .98 
d′4 3.71 3.71 4.24  .78 .99 .55 
RT gains        
RT1 791 833 795  238 262 295 
RT2 779 790 734  183 232 195 
RT3 745 727 662  197 184 180 
RT4 697 659 587  128 129 135 
RT losses        
RT1 851 819 855  263 251 309 
RT2 834 810 812  268 250 285 
RT3 792 769 748  218 226 254 
RT4 743 695 686  206 169 226 
Note. Indices 1 to 4 refer to the magnitude of the average net value, used for grouping the objects presented in the decision task (see Appendix A): level 1 = 0 
points; level 2 = ±40 points; level 3 = ±80 points; level 4 = ±120 points. N trials = Number of trials available for analyses; RT = response time of correct decisions 
in ms (based on the individual median RTs). Because for objects with large net values some adults committed few errors, we refrained from separate RT 
analyses of error decisions. However, both correct and error RTs were considered for the modeling. Model parameters are estimated from those conditions 
where accuracy is not at ceiling (or floor) and then constrain estimates for those conditions where accuracy is high (or low). That is, the model may capture 
differences in drift rates because other available conditions allow these parameters to be estimated; because RTs differ across the high-accuracy conditions, RTs 
are sufficient to determine drift rates (see Ratcliff, 2014).  
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Figure 1. Illustration of the drift-diffusion model. The vertical axis is the decision-related 
strength-of-evidence axis, and the horizontal axis is the time axis. Diffusion processes start at 
point z and move over time until the upper boundary (positioned at a) or the lower boundary 
(positioned at zero) is reached. Decision time distributions associated with the upper and the 
lower boundaries are shown. The two oscillating sample tracks illustrate that different 
boundaries can be reached with the same (in the example: positive) drift rate due to random 
influence, as given by the diffusion constant s. Total RT is the sum of the decision time and a 
nondecision component Ter that measures duration of peripheral processes such as encoding and 
motor response execution. In all present analyses, the upper boundary was associated with 
“accept” decisions and the lower boundary with “reject” decisions; s was fixed at 1. Adapted 
with permission from “Adult age differences in interference from a prospective-memory task: a 
diffusion model analysis” by S. Horn, U. J. Bayen, and R. E. Smith, 2013, Psychonomic Bulletin 

























(A) Training Phase 
 
(B) Decision Task 
 
Figure 2. Training procedure and the decision task.  
(A) The training phase comprised at least three learning blocks for colors and for shapes, respectively, in 
alternating sequence. On each trial, participants saw pairs of symbols (e.g., blue and green) and were 
asked to choose the item with the higher value. After choice, participants received feedback, thereby 
implicitly learning value ranges associated with specific colors and shapes. For example, the color green 
might be associated with a gain between +80 and +120 points, drawn from a distribution U {80, 120}. 
Training was terminated after a criterion (90% accurate comparative judgments) was reached for each 
domain (colors, shapes). Each learning block included all possible pairings of symbols and each symbol 
in a pair was shown once on the left and right side of the screen, respectively. 
(B) Decision task, in which participants saw feature combinations that were associated with net values. 
For example, the expected net value of a green circle would result from the combination of the gain value 
associated with color green (e.g., between + 80 and + 120) and the loss value associated with the circle 
(e.g., between 0 and −40). Successful gain–loss integration from memory would lead participants to 
accept this object. An exemplary payoff matrix for a given participant as a function of feature 
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Figure 3. Mean drift-rate parameters of the diffusion model as a function of age group and magnitude of the net value  
(level 1 = 0 points; level 2 = ±40 points; level 3 = ±80 points; level 4 = ±120 points). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
(A) Absolute drift rates for positive gain objects 
(B) Absolute drift rates for negative loss objects 
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Figure 4. Mean diffusion model parameters as a function of age group (error bars represent 95% confidence intervals). 
(A) Nondecision time Ter (in s) 
(B) Across-trial variability in nondecision time st 
(C) Boundary separation a (decision cautiousness) 
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Appendix A 
Pay-Offs in the Decision Task 
Figure A1 shows an exemplary payoff matrix as a function of symbol combinations for a given 
participant. Color and shape symbols were selected from a larger pool and the mappings of 
specific symbols to specific value ranges were randomized across participants. This 
randomization ensured that identical stimulus features differed in values across participants (e.g., 
the color green could be associated with a high value for one participant, but a low value for 
another) and that the values of stimuli were not confounded with their specific perceptual or 
physical properties. 
On each trial (during both training and the decision task), an integer value for a feature was 
drawn from a discrete uniform distribution U {a, b} with absolute range of |a−b| = 40 points and 
with lower limit |a| ∈ (0, 40, 80, 120) and upper limit |b| ∈ (40, 80, 120, 160). During training, 
each participant learned to associate four colors with four different value ranges and four shapes 
with four different ranges of monetary costs (or vice versa, counterbalanced across subjects). In 
the subsequent value-based decision task, each object was a combination of both color and 
shape, and thus carried information about gains and losses, as the two examples (i.e., green circle 
and blue rectangle) illustrate. Altogether, 16 different objects appeared during the decision task 
and each was shown twice in each of the experimental blocks. The average (expected) 
magnitudes of the net value of these objects were −120, −80, −40, 0, +40, +80, +120 points. 
Objects with a net value of zero (i.e., objects for which, on average, gains and losses, cancel each 
other out) were included in the task as ambiguous guessing stimuli, for which the diffusion 
model predicts chance level performance (the feature combinations on the diagonal of the 
matrix). As expected, accuracy or drift rates did neither differ between age groups nor from 




chance level for these objects. Nonetheless, these stimuli were included in the modeling and can 
serve as reference in revealing participants’ decision tendencies and for constraining other 
parameter estimates. 
For analyzing participants’ performance in the value-based decision task, we classified objects 
based on their average net value into four magnitude categories (0, ±40, ±80, ±120 points) for 
gains and losses, respectively. These categories had similar effects on performance as stimulus-
difficulty levels in other decision tasks (e.g., the information extractable from a stimulus in a 
mnemonic or perceptual decision task). For ease of reference, objects with a net value of zero 
that had point values > 0 on specific trials were classified as “gain objects” and objects with 
point values < 0 were classified as “loss objects”; for objects with an exact value of zero on 
specific trials, the domain assignment for analyses was determined randomly with equal 
probability. 
 
Figure A1. Exemplary payoff matrix for the acceptance of stimuli in the decision task as a 
function of color-shape feature combinations (for rejection of stimuli, the associated outcome 
value was generally zero).   






 Comparison of diffusion models with different constellations of free parameters. The 
best-performing model (#19) that was used for further analyses in this study is marked in 
boldface. The column entries for model parameters v, Ter, B = z/a, η, sz, st, indicate whether these 
parameters were constrained (–) or free to vary across the experimental factors (NV = net-value 
level; D = domain gain/loss), or fixed at specific values (.50 or 0); K = number of estimated 
model parameters; model-selection indices refer to the likelihood of a model (−2 ln L), the 
average BIC ranking across participants (separated by age group), and number of participants (n) 
for which a specific model had the lowest BIC; for model variants 25-28 that assumed equivalent 
drift v for gain and loss stimuli, data were collapsed across gain and loss stimuli (with the upper 
and lower boundaries associated with correct and error decisions, respectively). In the selected 
model, the across-trials variabilities η = sz = 0 were fixed (in line with the finding that correct and 
error RTs were similar) but variability in nondecision time st was included (in line with the 
notion that st is often important for capturing the shape of the RT distributions; e.g., Lerche et al., 
2017). Finally, we note that analyses with the runner-up BIC model (#23; which additionally 
assumed unbiased responding; B = .50) would have otherwise led to identical conclusions as 
discussed in the results section. 
  




Table B1 Results of the Model Comparison 
Model 
Variant 
Model Parameters K Model Selection Indices 
# v Ter a B η sz st  −2 ln L BIC rank BIC winner n 
          4th grade 6th grade adults  
1 NV,D NV,D – – – – – 21 581.30 11.93 14.20 17.53 0 
2 NV,D NV,D – – – 0 0 19 641.72 21.05 21.07 21.97 0 
3 NV,D NV,D – – 0 0 – 19 591.77 10.95 13.23 16.20 0 
4 NV,D NV,D – – 0 0 0 18 646.54 18.82 20.73 21.13 0 
5 NV,D NV,D – .50 – – – 20 594.31 14.89 14.37 17.10 0 
6 NV,D NV,D – .50 – 0 0 18 650.07 22.57 20.97 21.03 0 
7 NV,D NV,D – .50 0 0 – 18 606.10 13.25 13.80 16.37 0 
8 NV,D NV,D – .50 0 0 0 17 656.67 20.86 20.67 20.90 0 
9 NV,D NV – – – – – 17 588.84 6.96 8.67 10.63 0 
10 NV,D NV – – – 0 0 15 660.35 18.68 18.83 15.80 0 
11 NV,D NV – – 0 0 – 15 599.27 5.75 7.77 9.47 1 
12 NV,D NV – – 0 0 0 14 665.67 16.36 18.53 15.07 0 
13 NV,D NV – .50 – – – 16 606.88 10.32 11.47 10.80 1 
14 NV,D NV – .50 – 0 0 14 671.33 20.54 20.63 16.20 0 
15 NV,D NV – .50 0 0 – 14 617.07 9.04 9.53 10.03 3 
16 NV,D NV – .50 0 0 0 13 676.45 18.64 19.47 16.00 0 
17 NV,D – – – – – – 14 597.26 4.89 4.97 5.27 9 
18 NV,D – – – – 0 0 12 683.63 17.50 16.73 13.83 3 
19* NV,D – – – 0 0 – 12 605.61 2.93 3.50 3.83 22 
20 NV,D – – – 0 0 0 11 687.68 15.39 16.63 12.63 2 
21 NV,D – – .50 – – – 13 613.08 6.61 5.70 6.03 4 
22 NV,D – – .50 – 0 0 11 690.63 18.79 17.37 13.87 0 
23 NV,D – – .50 0 0 – 11 623.59 5.32 4.87 4.97 21 
24 NV,D – – .50 0 0 0 10 698.98 17.18 17.40 12.97 3 
25 NV – – .50 – – – 9 705.49 15.00 11.93 16.73 4 
26 NV – – .50 – 0 0 7 792.93 24.36 21.20 21.57 0 
27 NV – – .50 0 0 – 7 717.28 14.00 11.20 16.57 15 
28 NV – – .50 0 0 0 6 796.63 23.43 20.57 21.50 0 
Note. *Selected diffusion model variant 
  






Path analytic methods were used to concurrently explore the mediating role of different cognitive 
abilities in the development of value-based decisions. In the present paradigm, developmental 
differences emerged mainly in decision accuracy. In the diffusion model analysis, this was 
reflected in corresponding differences in drift rate v (for positive gain objects) and, to a smaller 
extent, in nondecision time Ter. We used multiple mediation analysis (with cognitive-ability 
composites as parallel mediators; see Figure C1) to predict participants’ decision performance 
(criterion variable Y). The comprehensive results of these analyses (including standardized 
regression weights with their confidence intervals) are in Table C1. 
Age effects on drift rate v (gains) as criterion were fully mediated through numerical ability 
scores and memory for value-feature mappings (composite of encoding accuracy and post-task 
memory), but not through fluid ability or verbal test scores. The same pattern emerged for 
decision accuracy as criterion variable. In contrast, there was no mediation of age through any of 
these cognitive measures on nondecision time Ter (or RTs) as criterion. Finally, we note that 
mediational path analyses with cross-sectional data might differ from those with longitudinal 
data (e.g., Lindenberger, von Oertzen, Ghisletta, & Hertzog, 2011). 





Figure C1. Multiple mediator model that predicts effects of age on decision performance  
(Criterion Variable Y) through measures of mnemonic accuracy (Memory), fluid abilities 
(Fluid), numerical/arithmetic abilities (Numeric), and vocabulary (Verbal). 
 
Table C1 
Mediation Analyses with Drift, Nondecision Time, Accuracy, Response Time as Criterion 
 Criterion 
 Drift v (gains) Drift v (losses) Nondecision Time Ter Accuracy RT 
Model Coefficient/ 
Description 
     
      
Total and direct effects of Age      
 c (total effect Age → Y) .38 [.18, .58] .15 [−.06, .36] −.27 [−.48, −.06] .37 [.17, .57] −.04 [−.25, .18] 
 c′ (direct effect Age → Y) .04 [−.22, .30] −.16 [−.45, .13] −.25 [−.58, .07] .09 [−.14, .33] −.01 [−.35, .32] 
Indirect effects (Mediation)      
 a1  b1 (through memory) .08 [.01, .21] .08 [.01, .21] .01 [−.03, .09] .11 [.01, .27] .02 [−.02, .12] 
 a2  b2 (through fluid) .01 [−.19, .18] .03 [−.17, .21] .04 [−.15, .23] .03 [−.13, .17] .02 [−.18, .24] 
 a3  b3 (through numeric) .20 [.09, .33] .16 [.01, .31] −.03 [−.20, .12] .17 [.05, .30] −.03 [−.20, .16] 
 a4  b4 (through verbal) .05 [−.17, .22] .05 [−.14, .24] −.03 [−.19, .16] −.03 [−.20, .11] −.04 [−.24, .16] 
Age → Mediator      
 a1 (age → memory) .21 [.01, .42] .21 [.01, .42] .21 [.01, .42] .21 [.01, .42] .21 [.01, .42] 
 a2 (age → fluid) .66 [.50, .82] .66 [.50, .82] .66 [.50, .82] .66 [.50, .82] .66 [.50, .82] 
 a3 (age → numeric) .60 [.43, .77] .60 [.43, .77] .60 [.43, .77] .60 [.43, .77] .60 [.43, .77] 
 a4 (age → verbal) .68 [.52, .84] .68 [.52, .84] .68 [.52, .84] .68 [.52, .84] .68 [.52, .84] 
Mediator → Criterion      
 b1 (memory → Y) .38 [.19, .56] .36 [.16, .57] .05 [−.17, .28] .53 [.37, .69] .11 [−.12, .34] 
 b2 (fluid → Y) .01 [−.24, .26] .04 [−.25, .32] .05 [−.26, .37] .04 [−.19, .27] .03 [−.30, .35] 
 b3 (numeric → Y) .34 [.09, .59] .27 [−.01, .55] −.05 [−.36, .26] .28 [.06, .50] −.04 [−.36, .28] 
 b4 (verbal → Y) .07 [−.20, .33] .07 [−.22, .37] −.05 [−.38, .28] −.04 [−.28, .19] −.05 [−.39, .29] 
Note. Model coefficients are standardized regression weights in the mediation model (see Figure C1); 95% confidence intervals are in brackets 
and indicate significant effects if an interval does not include zero (marked in boldface); c is the total effect of age on the criterion variable Y (i.e., 
when potential mediators are ignored); c′ is the direct effect of age when mediators are concurrently considered; ai × bi is the indirect effect of 
age on Y through a specific mediator Mi, while concurrently controlling for all other mediators in the model; indirect-effect estimates are based on 






















Quality of Individual Model Fits 
Goodness of fit of the diffusion model was examined quantitatively and qualitatively. 
Overall, these evaluations suggested that our selected model variant fit the data from all age 
groups reasonably well on the individual level and that parameter values could thus be 
meaningfully interpreted. Goodness of fits was similar to previous applications of the diffusion 
model in other rapid decision paradigms. 
Predicted values of the selected diffusion model variant are plotted against observed values 
to determine model fit for each participant and across all 8 experimental conditions qualitatively. 
Panel A shows observed and predicted accuracy (correct acceptances and rejections of gain and 
loss objects, respectively). Panels B-F show observed and predicted .50, .10, .30, 70, .90 
quantiles of correct responses of the RT distributions. Values on the diagonals (with a slope of 
+1) would indicate perfect fit. As can be seen, the residuals do not indicate systematic deviations 
in model predictions. Correspondence between observed and predicted values was generally high 
for both accuracy (all rs > .90) and RT (all rs > .88 for the selected RT quantiles). Overall, the 
diffusion model adequately reproduced the effects on individual RTs and on accuracy in the 
value-based decision paradigm for children as well as younger adults. In each plot, each 
participant contributed 8 data points across all 4 (Expected Value Level)  2 (Stimulus Type) 
experimental conditions.

























































































































































































Online Supplementary Materials for Article: “Good + Bad = ? Developmental Differences  
in Balancing Gains and Losses in Decisions from Memory” 
Supplement 1. Measures of gain-loss attitudes. Following Tom, Fox, Trepel, and Poldrack 
(2007), we calculated a behavioral measure of loss aversion (parameter ) as the ratio of the loss-
to-gain impact. Specifically, we performed logistic regression separately for each participant 
with the magnitudes of the object gain and loss attributes as predictors and accept/reject 
decisions as the dependent criterion variable. Behavioral loss aversion for each participant was 
then computed as  
 = |b|loss ÷ |b|gain 
where |b|loss and |b|gain are the absolute unstandardized individual regression coefficients for the 
gain and loss attributes, respectively. Parameter  is similar to the  measure of the prospect-
theory value funtion (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) with    indicating a relatively stronger 
impact of losses than gains on decisions. Notably, in the present value-based decision paradigm, 
median s were   within all age groups and did not differ between age groups. Figure S1 
shows the positively-skewed distributions of individual s as a function of age group. Figure S2 
shows moderate correlations between  and the diffusion-model bias parameters vbias and z/a. 
 
Figure S1. Distributions of individual loss-aversion parameters  as a function of age group 
(with  > 1 indicating loss aversion and  < 1 indicating gain seeking). 
           4th grade                                           6th grade                                         Adlts 






Figure S2. Correlations between individual choice-based measure of loss aversion 
(parameter  cf. Tom et al., 2007) and the diffusion-model estimates of response bias (z/a) 
and stimulus-evaluation drift bias (vbias). 
 
  




Supplement 2. Zero-order correlations among z-transformed tests scales used to construct 
overarching composite measures. For the mediational analyses (presented in Appendix C of 
the main article) we computed z-transformed unit-weighted composites of average drift, of 
memory, numerical, and fluid abilities for more stable measurement. As shown below, all 
constituent scales of a composite measure were correlated (but we also obtained some evidence 
for a positive manifold; e.g., speed-test scores were not exclusively correlated with other fluid-
abilities measures). Figure S3: Relations among fluid-abilities measures. Figure S4: Relations 
among numerical-abilities measures. Figure S5: Relations among drift rates across domains and 
value level (graphs created with JASP, 2018). 
 
Figure S3. Fluid abilities tests.   





Figure S4. Numerical abilities tests.  





Figure S5. Drift rates. 
  




Supplement 2. Relation between accuracy (proportion of correct decisions), response time (RT) 
in the gain-loss decision task and diffusion-model parameters drift (v), boundary separation (a), 
nondecision time (Ter).  
 
Figure S6. Relation between accuracy, response times, and model parameters. 
  




Supplement 3. Distributions of estimated diffusion-model parameters (combined box-bean 
plots; circles show the individual parameter estimates) as a function of age group (4th grade, 6th 
grade, young adults). For drift rates, the absolute values |v| are plotted. Consequently, the drift-
rate averages in net-value category NV = 0 are slightly larger than zero because positive and 
negative drifts add up and do not cancel each other out (graphs created with JASP, 2018). 
Drift Rate Parameters: Gains 
 







































































































Parameters Ter, st, a, z/a 
 



























































Supplement 4. Description of cognitive test scales and procedures. 
To measure fluid abilities, numerical/arithmetic abilities, and vocabulary, all participants 
completed subscales of standard cognitive tests (including German adaptations of the Wechsler 
adult intelligence scale WAIS-IV, of the culture fair intelligence test CFT-20, of Panamath, and 
of arithmetic school tests) that are described in more detail below.  
Fluid Abilities Tests 
Cognitive Speed 
We used a paper-pencil version of the digit-symbol substitution test (adapted from WAIS-IV; 
Petermann, 2012) as an indicator of cognitive speed. In this speed test, all participants completed 
as many items on the sheet as possible within 2 min.  
Reasoning Matrices 
To measure abstract reasoning as an indicator for nonverbal fluid intelligence, participants 
completed an adapted paper-pencil subscale of the culture fair intelligence test CFT-20 (Weiß, 
2006). All participants first completed three examples and then had 3 min to complete up to 15 
items of increasing difficulty. The items consisted of 2  2 or 3  3 matrices of geometric 
patterns with one missing piece in the bottom right corner. On each trial, participants filled in the 
missing piece by choosing one of five provided patterns.  
Digit Span Forward and Backward 
Participants heard a list of random numbers, presented by a trained experimenter at the rate of 
one item per s, and were asked to recall these items in presented order (forward span) or in 
backward order (backward span). The forward test began with two sequences with a length of 
two digits and sequence length increased up to nine digits or until two recall errors occurred for a 
sequence of a given length. The same procedure was then used for the backward test, with a 
maximum sequence length of eight digits.  
Numerical Abilities Tests 
Number Line Task 
Each participant completed 12 number line estimation problems (e.g., Siegler & Opfer, 2003) 
that were adapted from a standardized German numerical-abilities test (RZD test; Jacobs & 
Petermann, 2005). On each trial, a number line (with an upper and lower limit, defined by 2- or 
3-digit Arabic numerals) was shown and participants were asked to locate another, symbolically 
expressed 1- or 2-digit number on the line. 




Arithmetic Subtraction Task 
In this paper-pencil speed task (adapted from an arithmetic school test, HRT; Haffner, Baro, 
Parzer, & Resch, 2005), participants completed up to 40 items on a sheet within 2 min.  
Each item posed a subtraction problem (e.g., “23 – 6 = ____”), where participants had to fill in 
the blanks with the correct number. Items increased in difficulty (from 1- to 3-digit items).  
Arithmetic Comparison Task  
In this paper-pencil speed task (adapted from HRT; Haffner et al., 2005), participants completed 
up to 40 items on a sheet within 2 min. Each item posed a comparison problem  
(e.g., “2 ____ 817 – 816”), where participants had to fill in the blanks with the correct operator 
(“=”, “<”, “>”) to make expression a true statement. Items increased in difficulty (from 1- to 4-
digit items).  
Panamath 
The Panamath test was used to explore participants’ “approximate number sense” (Halberda, Ly, 
Wilmer, Naiman, & Germine, 2012). It has been argued that scores on the Panamath test predict 
performance on other math achievement tests (e.g., Halberda, Mazzocco, & Feigenson, 2008). 
We therefore expected number sense to be related to performance in the present arithmetic tasks. 
In line with this, we found that Panamath performance was significantly correlated with 
participants’ scores in the arithmetic comparison task (r = .47) and arithmetic subtraction task (r 
= .42). Moreover, the correlation between Panamath performance and number-line estimation 
scores was significant (r = .22). All participants worked on a version of the Panamath for 6 min, 
in which the task difficulty (i.e., four number-ratio levels) was adjusted by the program during 
testing such that accuracy (but not RTs) was matched across individuals. We therefore used 
participants’ RTs as dependent variable for further analyses because significant variability 
between age groups emerged in the RTs (but not in accuracy or the Weber fraction w).  
Vocabulary 
In a paper-pencil vocabulary test, participants completed 30 items of increasing difficulty. Each 
item consisted of one probe word (e.g., “scarf”) and participants were asked to choose a 
semantically matching target out of five other words with the closest meaning connection (e.g., 
“tie”).  
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